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Smith School Water Programme 
 
The Smith School Water Programme aims to understand and address water-related risks to economic growth, 
human development and environmental stewardship. A problem-based and interdisciplinary approach focuses 
on designing, testing and implementing new tools, technologies and models. Current projects are making 
science, policy and practice advances in the areas of urban utility finance, rural water institutions, groundwater 
risk management, smart river management, and mobile-enabled water technologies.  
 
The Water Programme works in partnership with the School of Geography and the Environment, Department of 
Engineering Science, Skoll Centre for Social Entrepreneurship and the Saïd Business School. The programme is a 
core member of the wider Oxford Water Network with over 70 faculty and researchers working globally on 
water science and policy challenges across biodiversity, climate systems, economics, ecosystems, energy, 
engineering, food systems, hydrology, law, politics and public health. 
 
The programme is funded from competitive grants won from UK research councils (ESRC, NERC), DFID, John 
Fell Fund and the Skoll Foundation. Past donors include OECD, World Bank and the Gates Foundation. 
Enterprise partners in the programme include global leaders in the extractives industry, beverages/food sector, 
insurance, mobile network operators, and wireless technology and semi-conductor industries. 
 
 
For more information: http://www.smithschool.ox.ac.uk/research-programmes/water.php  
 
  
                                                                                                               
 Water Programme, Working Paper 1 – March 2014 
Executive Summary 
 
Institutional transformations are required if Africa is to deliver the universal Human Right to Water to 275 
million rural people without improved water services. Improving the reliability of one million handpumps 
which should deliver drinking water to over 200 million rural Africans will be a major contribution to 
translating water rights into measureable results. This study tests a new maintenance service model over a one 
year period in rural Kenya using mobile-enabled data to improve operational and financial performance by 
reducing risks at scale.  
 
Results have led to  
 
a) a ten-fold reduction in handpump downtime (days not working),  
b) a shift to 98 per cent of handpumps functioning,  
c) a fairer and more flexible payment model contingent on service delivery,  
d) new and objective metrics to guide water service regulatory reform,  
e) a revised financial architecture shaped by an output-based payment model.  
 
The model outlines a new and replicable framework for policy and investment behaviour informed by rural 
water users’ more expansive views of the design and delivery of rural water institutions than currently 
prescribed. 
 
  
 
 
Only 70% of handpumps are 
working at any one time in Africa 
Is the Human Right to Water  
Achievable in Rural Africa? 
275 million people without 
improved water in rural Africa 
0.9 billion 
people will live in 
rural Africa by 
2050 
< 1 in 5 
handpump 
users pre-pay 
for water 
40 billion 
hours spent 
collecting water 
every year 
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From Rights to Results –  
Evidence from Kyuso  
98% of handpumps 
are now working in 
Kyuso 
Handpump downtime reduced 10-fold 
from 27 days to <3 days 
4 in 5 users 
willing to prepay 
after the trial 
People pay fairer 
prices, based on actual 
pump usage, for a  
better service  
5 times higher 
revenue collection  
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1. From Rights to Results 
 
The Human Right to Water and Sanitation was recognised by the United Nations General Assembly in 2010 
with the goal of the progressive realisation of sufficient, safe, close, affordable and reliable water services for 
everyone. In Africa water service reliability remains most elusive in rural areas where extreme poverty and 
water insecurity are often synonymous. One million handpumps supply water to over 200 million rural water 
users across the continent. Yet, one in three handpumps is thought not to be working at any one time. Major 
investments in infrastructure have not translated into reliable water services over time. Delivering long-term 
water maintenance services carries political and organisational risk but is the key to rural water supply 
sustainability. Without verifiable, comparable and regulated water service metrics ambitious political targets 
will continue to be set but are unlikely to be met, as historical evidence demonstrates. The systemic information 
deficit in rural water reliability over decades has insulated policy, institutional and investment decisions from 
scrutiny and reform. This is now changing as the confluence of a global water policy goal and mobile 
information architecture can promote and test universal delivery models. This report provides evidence from a 
12-month ‘smart handpump’ trial in Kenya in 2013 which tests a new maintenance service model with the aim to 
support progress towards universal and reliable water services.  
 
The study was funded under the UK Department for International Development’s (DFID) New and Emerging 
Technologies programme in response to the Government of Kenya’s demand for empirical evidence of new 
models to improve rural water service delivery.  
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2. Institutional Challenges and Opportunities 
2.1. A Broken Loop Model 
 
The current model of rural water service delivery is broken (figure below). Money flows down from donors and 
government to install infrastructure but little reliable information on performance flows back. Increased use of 
handpump mapping exercises by survey teams may usefully identify handpumps working one day of the year 
but this leaves the remaining 99.7 per cent of any year unknown. With a growing consensus on the Human 
Right to Water monitoring daily services is increasingly important. For governments and donors, knowing 
whether investments deliver verifiable impacts over time rather than simply that budgets were spent is 
transforming established thinking. Mobile networks provide an inclusive architecture to reduce the information 
asymmetry between investments and outcomes. Information alone is insufficient to make progress but 
information is necessary to track and improve accountable service delivery. Information can improve 
institutional performance and shape appropriate roles and responsibilities between communities, governments 
and donors to close the loop between well-meaning investments and quantifiable outcomes. Donors can 
demonstrate value-for-money, government and water service regulators can align performance with 
measureable outcomes, and communities can contribute to financial sustainability through user payments that 
are contingent upon service delivery.  
 
 
  
Regulation of water service delivery depends on reliable and regular information for government, the public 
and donors to know how investments translate into measureable and objective metrics of water services. Local 
government (County, District) are often responsible for implementation and coordination of activities at an 
operational level. Post-construction activities of operation and maintenance are the responsibility of the 
community. These activities commonly include creating user committees to determine access arrangements, 
water fees and maintenance arrangements.  By transferring handpump ownership and operational 
Legend  WSP – Water Service Provider (here, Community Handpump Management)
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responsibility to a community of water users the state provides the technical means by which individuals can 
access water. In theory, handpump users have the right incentives to deliver effective services tailored to local 
requirements. However, over the last decade there has been increasing evidence that communities are not able 
to manage handpumps reliably, with implications for public health and poverty reduction.  
 
The decentralisation of rural water services to rural communities represents an almost unique model of the roles 
and responsibilities between the state and the community. In an all-Africa infrastructure assessment, the World 
Bank reports that central, regional or local governments play a dominant role in planning, implementation and 
finance. It is only in the area of providing and maintaining water services that local communities have a leading 
role, precisely where the authors identify most challenges occur. Analysis of over 25,000 handpumps in Liberia, 
Sierra Leone and Uganda provides data on the significant and wide-spread challenges with the only cross-
country and significant determinants of handpump functionality being recently-installed handpumps, pre-
payment of maintenance costs and less isolated communities; unfortunately, very few handpumps meet these 
conditions. 
 
A key hypothesis of this study is that scale reduces risk. Currently communities take on all the risk associated 
with failure of their handpump.  Comparing the baseline data to the one-year Kyuso trial, evidence – presented 
in the sections below – indicates that these operational and financial risks can be reduced by community 
incorporation into a larger system. This is the law of large numbers that drives insurance models around the 
world, including rural Africa (livestock, agriculture, health). Scale can smooth financial risk in comparison to 
going alone which compounds risk. 
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2.2. Maintenance Service Provider Model 
 
Working with the District Water Office a new maintenance service was designed and powered by a mobile-
enabled transmitter installed into 66 existing handpumps providing water to up to 20,000 people. The study set 
out to explore if reliable and timely information on handpump functionality could improve institutional, 
operational and financial performance. 
 
 
  
The new Maintenance Service Provider model introduces modifications to the scale, monitoring and finance of 
water service delivery: 
 
1. Communities are clustered to provide economies of scale and pool risk in the operation and 
financial delivery of maintenance services. We first tested to see if this was socially-acceptable using 
a stated preference method; 
2. A single maintenance service provider was introduced, with accountability for service delivery to all 
communities that voluntarily participated in the study.  The maintenance service provider was 
locally-appointed via the District Water Office; 
3. There was spares parts’ inventory system to ensure adequate stock was always available. Each 
repair event logged parts used and logistical data; 
4. Information on handpump use was automatically transmitted to trigger maintenance visits.  This 
was shared with the service provider, local government and the regulator using a bespoke user 
interface; 
5. Communities were informed before the trial began that the free service would last one year after 
which they could return to their former maintenance arrangements or pay an external provider for 
the continuation of the maintenance service.  
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The objectives of the study can be separated under institutional, operational and financial headings: 
 
Institutional: 
 
• Design and test a new maintenance model based on the availability of timely handpump 
functionality information; 
• Evaluate this model, identifying limitations, potential improvements and pathways to scale. 
 
Operational: 
 
• Reduce handpump down-times (days non-functioning) through a faster response to handpump 
breakdowns; 
• Test the ‘smart handpumps’ hardware for a year under representative field conditions. 
 
Financial: 
 
• Accurately measure the cost of delivering this information-enabled maintenance service; 
• Evaluate community acceptance of the model and willingness-to-pay in the future. 
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3. Study Site and Methodology 
3.1. Study Site 
 
The study site is situated in Kyuso District in Kitui County, Kenya, (38° 10’ E, 0° 35’ S; 660-880 m elevation; 2,446 
km²) located 267 km east of Nairobi with a population of 26,848 households. The population is almost entirely 
rural (99%) with two out of three households classified as ‘poor’. The two towns in the District are Kyuso and 
Ngomeni Town. Average rainfall in the period 1961 to 2006 is 774 mm with increasing variation in decadal 
rainfall patterns during both the long rains (mean=250 mm; March-May) and short rains (mean=426 mm; 
October-December). Temperatures range from 14° to 34° with February and September marking increasingly 
severe and extended dry periods. Livelihood systems are largely agro-pastoral with cattle and goat husbandry 
combined with low-value, rain-fed agriculture (maize, beans) on small plots (<1 hectare). Households rely on 
casual labour and remittances for most of their cash income. Over half the population (54%) use unimproved 
water sources (stream, pond, dam). Of the remainder, 39 per cent use wells or boreholes, which include 66 
Afridev handpumps installed over the last 20 years to help improve drinking water services. 
 
Study site, Kyuso District, Kenya 
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3.2. What is a ‘Smart Handpump’? 
3.2.1. Hardware 
A smart handpump has a GSM transmitter 
securely fitted inside the handle of the pump. The 
transmitter automatically sends data on handpump 
use via SMS over the mobile phone network. The 
transmitter is small and robust with no moving 
parts with a specially designed antenna that fits 
discreetly to the handle.  Installation is simple, 
enabling it to be retrofitted into existing pumps in 
the field or built into new pumps prior to 
deployment.  The prototype smart handpump was 
tested in Lusaka in July 2011 with peer-reviewed 
results published early the following year.  These 
trials demonstrated proof-of-concept, and the 
transmitter’s ability, following calibration, to 
produce an estimate of the volume of water 
produced by the pump to which it was fitted, over 
and above simply indicating whether the pump was being used or not.  This led to the Kyuso study with the 
first installation in August 2012 preceding the full trial running from January through December 2013. 
Hardware and software improvements have been made progressively over time with a more efficient 
transmitter launched in a larger programme in January 2014.  
 
The transmitter offers three key benefits: 
 
1. Measurement of handpump usage and associated volumetric water use to monitor service delivery; 
2. Remote surveillance of maintenance service delivery and down-time to guide performance-based 
contracts; 
3. Objective data that can improve infrastructure planning and investment, and promote sector 
accountability. 
 
3.2.2.  Database and User Interface 
The data transmitted from the pumps are captured 
in a relational database and presented using a 
bespoke graphic user interface. The database was 
built in a modular fashion so that the system can 
easily be expanded to any scale. The user interface 
was developed with the support and input of the 
Ministry of Water and Irrigation, Water Services 
Regulatory Board and District Water Office. The 
system processes and presents data transmitted 
from each handpump.  
 
During installation the latitude and longitude of 
each pump was recorded by Global Positioning 
System (GPS).  An interactive map with markers 
representing the pumps was integrated into the 
website using the Google API. Each pump location 
is represented by a marker on the map, with the 
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status of the pump (fully operational, 
needing checking, broken, or historical) 
represented by the colour of the marker. 
 
The graphs page is a convenient interface 
to monitor a pump's output and history, 
to see usage patterns and identify 
potential pump failures.  The graph data 
are extracted directly from the MySQL 
database via a PHP interface based on the 
selection made (days, weeks, months, all), 
and a graph is generated dynamically, 
ensuring the data are always up-to-date. 
It is also a pure java script-based library, 
thereby avoiding the need for an online 
connection or resource-hungry plugins.  
 
 
 
3.3. Sampling Frame and Methods 
 
The study site was purposively selected following a waterpoint mapping exercise in 2011 that identified the 
location of the handpumps. It is an area where extreme poverty, increasing hydrological risk, uneven mobile 
network coverage and handpump dependency broadly reflect the conditions of the wider rural African context. 
Official support and guidance was sought and granted from the Ministry of Water and Irrigation, Water Services 
Regulatory Board, TanAthi Water Services Board, District Water Officer and local communities and traditional 
leaders. Ethical permissions for social research methods were reviewed and granted by Oxford University. Part 
of the ethical permission was based on the provision of a free, one-year maintenance service that would 
transition into a payment model if successful. Therefore no harm would come to any water user but it would 
provide experience of the new maintenance model while the research team gathered detailed information on the 
costs of service delivery, user preferences, and the institutional, operational and technical performance of the 
new technology.  
 
The decision to work in an area of uneven mobile network coverage was made on three grounds: (1) to reflect 
the wider context of significant gaps in mobile coverage across rural Africa; (2) to assess the value of the data 
generated, even if it has gaps; and (3) to permit a stratified sample of handpumps split between ‘actively-
managed’ handpumps and ‘crowd-sourced’ handpumps. Actively managed handpumps were the responsibility 
of the research team to track daily data on functionality to trigger maintenance cover. Crowd-sourced 
handpumps relied on the water users to trigger maintenance alerts; the users were informed of the free service 
and provided with contact details through a weather-proof sign attached to the handpump. The design would 
permit a quasi-experimental analysis of relative benefits and costs of installing the transmitter.  
 
Iterative steps were taken in the technical and socio-economic components of the study which were co-designed 
by Oxford and RFL staff, and administered by trained staff in local languages: 
 
1. July 2012 – baseline survey and choice experiment of user preferences; 
2. August 2012 – re-survey of handpumps with GSM data and installation of first transmitter; 
3. October 2012 – development and testing of Graphic User Interface (GUI); 
4. November 2012 – design of and training for maintenance service model; 
5. December 2012 – deployment of transmitters; 
 Water Programme, Working Paper 1 – March 2014    9 
6. January 2013 – launch of the one year free maintenance trial and monitoring programme; 
7. July 2013 – interim evaluation and focus group discussions with handpump users; 
8. December 2013 – final evaluation and focus group discussions with handpump users; end of study 
period. 
3.4. Baseline Survey 
 
In order to test the model against the status-quo and understand the choices and preferences of water users, a 
baseline survey was conducted in July 2012. This involved interviewing 124 voluntary respondents who were 
collecting water at 21 handpumps. Sampled respondents were mainly female (64%) with an average age of 41 
years with an average of 5.3 household members. Median adult equivalent expenditure is USD 313 per year 
which is two thirds (68%) of the global poverty line of USD 1.25 per person per day. Handpumps provide the 
majority of households with their main drinking water source (59%) and cooking, bathing and washing water 
(67%) throughout the year. However the dominant use of handpump water for households is for livestock 
watering (74%). Almost nine in ten households (86%) consider the water safe to drink though one in three 
claimed to treat the water by either boiling or chlorination.  
3.4.1.  Pump Breakdown Data 
In the previous 12 months to the survey, 18 of the 21 handpumps 
(86%) had experienced a failure. The average failure rate was just 
over two failures per year (range 0-10) with a total of 48 failures. 
The median repair time to fix a pump was six days with an 
average of 27 days (7% of cases had a downtime of 365 days and 
over). To generate these data multiple informants were asked and 
the average of their responses taken as the downtime. There was 
wide variation in responses but the aggregated data were 
consistent with available estimates. For example, a mapping 
survey of 440 Afridev handpumps in Kwale County by the 
project team in September 2013, estimated the average downtime 
of handpumps per breakdown at 37 days for functional pumps 
and 85 days for non-functional pumps. Average downtime 
estimates at ‘functioning’ handpumps will under-estimate the 
aggregate downtime figure as illustrated by the longer downtime 
in non-functioning handpumps in Kwale. Given the likely recall 
bias in estimating downtime by respondents we chose to use the 
figure of 27 days downtime per handpump per year as our 
baseline figure as it will likely be a conservative estimate. 
 
Over two in five households (44%) indicated they did not pay for water from their handpump. Among the 
majority that did pay a portfolio of overlapping payment approaches existed including a one-off membership 
fee, a monthly user fee and pay-as-you-go fees for drinking water containers or head of livestock. The most 
common payment modes were monthly fees which were generally USD 0.56 per month (30% of all paying 
households) or USD 1.1 per m3 water (Ksh2 per 20 litre container; 28% of all paying households). The opaque 
approach to fee collection is reflected in the financial challenges when a handpump breaks and needs repairing. 
It was reported that there are sometimes sufficient funds (24%), but more often there are not (36%), or funds 
which only cover minor repairs (18%).  
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Handpump failures are aggravated by delays in raising money in 40 per cent of cases with an average of 18 days 
to raise sufficient funds (median = 7 days; range 1-180 days). Unprompted concerns about handpump 
management showed maintenance to be a key priority across a range of overlapping factors: 
 
1. Repairs are too expensive (19%) 
2. Repairs take too long (17%) 
3. Handpump breaks too often (17%) 
4. Too many users (10%) 
5. Pump too far (8%) 
6. Water unsafe to drink (6%) 
7. Water fee too high (1%) 
 
3.4.2. User Preferences for Maintenance Service  
As part of the survey a choice experiment tested handpump user preferences for alternative maintenance 
models. The experiment was orthogonally-designed with ten pictorial cards that required choices across 
competing attributes of maintenance provider, maintenance level, payment mode, and payment level. A sample 
of 3,540 observations was produced from usable data from 118 handpump users. Results identify community 
management of maintenance services as the least preferred option (see figure below). 
  
 
 
The baseline data illustrate that rural water users have a more expansive view of alternative maintenance 
systems than currently prescribed. Without financial sustainability through full or partial cost recovery from 
water users no sustainable services will be maintained. Rural water users express a positive preference to pay 
for external maintenance services though payment behaviours are not uniform within communities. These 
findings have been further explored after the new maintenance service was introduced to understand user 
preferences for a pre-payment service. 
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3.5. Study Limitations  
 
We are aware of a number of limitations in the wider implications of the study: 
 
1. The sampling frame was not random and there was no control group against which to compare the 
treatment (see appendix); 
2. No detailed information was available on the environmental conditions (e.g. geology, recharge, 
geochemistry), the quality of installations across the sample handpumps, or the historical quality of 
maintenance services; 
3. The study did not have resources to evaluate health and wider poverty impacts on the study 
communities over time, or specifically related to failure events when alternative water sources were 
used for a number of days; 
4. The future financial behaviour of the study communities has yet to be tested and is probably the single 
most important barrier and opportunity to wider adoption and sustainability of the model. 
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4. Evidence for Institutional Reform  
4.1. Operational Sustainability  
4.1.1. Operational Effectiveness  
The primary research question is whether timely information of handpump failures can drive a maintenance 
model that leads to faster repairs. To this end we recorded when a maintenance alert was first raised and when 
the repair was actually completed, using the difference to indicate the time the handpump was not working and 
hence the effectiveness of the new maintenance model. The following figures show the range of downtimes for 
the two treatments (active, crowd) in the trial and the baseline. 
  
 
 
 
Group 
Mean days to 
repair 
Median days 
to repair 
Increase in chance of repair 
within two days vs. baseline2 
Repairs 
Baseline Survey1 27 6 - 48 
Study 
All repairs 2.6 1 4.3 111³ 
Actively 
Managed 
2.0 1 4.8 74 
Crowd 
Sourced 
3.7 3 3.2 37 
 
 
1. See methodology appendix for further detail. 
2. Risk Ratio or Relative Risk calculated with respect to the baseline case. All p-values are <0.001. 
3. This figure excludes instances when the repair time was not related to the maintenance service (e.g. the local 
community had to deepen the well before additional pipes and rods could be added by the mechanic). 
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The results provide evidence of significant improvements under the new maintenance model: 
 
• Pump outage times drop by an order of magnitude from a mean of 27 days to under three. 
• 89 per cent of repairs were completed within five days, rising to 95 per cent for the actively 
managed group.  
• A handpump is over four times more likely to have been repaired within two days than under the 
existing system. 
• The actively-managed handpumps were 50 per cent more likely to have been fixed within two days 
than the crowd-sourced handpumps. 
 
Durable but non-riveted stickers, with the maintenance number to call or text, were attached to the crowd-
sourced handpumps to evaluate how communities would react both in terms of any change in calling in repairs 
and the risks of petty vandalism. The focus group discussions conducted after the trial showed that at least eight 
of these stickers had been removed. 
 
Despite no clear geographical, usage or socio-
cultural differences between the two treatments, 
crowd-sourced handpumps were less likely to 
have had a repair: there were twice as many 
repairs conducted on the actively-managed pumps 
than the crowd-sourced pumps. Without 
information on the timings of sticker removals it is 
impossible to unpack when and why stickers were 
removed and their impact on downtimes, and how 
this might have contributed to there being fewer 
repairs. In the new and larger trial in Kwale, 
riveted plates have been attached to crowd-
sourced handpumps to better quantify differences 
(see photo). 
 
In contrast to this, and more optimistically, when 
repair dates were compared to the usage of pumps, it was clear that in a significant number of cases the pump 
was still working to a certain extent when the repair was undertaken. These cases suggest that pump users were 
calling in a pre-emptive repair and therefore, even though there may have been a response lag, there was no 
actual pump down time, with users having access to water throughout this period.  
 
All the pumps with a downtime of over 12 days during the trial were due to them requiring major repairs, e.g. 
new rising main sections, the spares for which were not held in Kyuso, as per the original study design. Given 
the demand for these larger spare parts, the larger trial in Kwale will include these in its spare parts inventory.  
4.1.2. Operational Scale 
For a maintenance service to be both effective and sustainable, the speed of response must be balanced with the 
resources required to deliver the service. Given that failures happen in an unpredictable fashion, with some 
peak times throughout the year, there must be excess capacity to cope with the variation.  In our case, this 
translated to the workload of the mechanic undertaking the repairs: if he has too much work, repair jobs will 
queue and downtimes will increase at peak times; too little work and it will be harder to make this an attractive 
and sustainable employment opportunity. 
 
The average time on site for a repair was three hours, and the average travel return time at two hours forty 
minutes.  Therefore, unless two repairs happened to be at pumps close together, or one en-route to the other, the 
mechanic could only be expected to make one repair on any given day.  The chart below shows how workload 
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varied from week to week, based on recorded time spent at each pump and calculated travel time based on 
kilometres. This does not include an estimate for administrative time, which would have taken around an hour 
or so each week.  For travel time a uniform estimate of average speed was used.  This is clearly a simplification 
as certain routes within Kyuso are faster than others and there would have been significant seasonal variations 
as roads became more difficult to pass during the rains.  
 
The average working hours on a repair day was five hours forty minutes.  With 136 repairs, and only a handful 
of repairs undertaken on the same day, this corresponds to about a 50 per cent workload.  However the 
workload is uneven with peaks during the year (see figure below).  Therefore, taken on aggregate, the mechanic 
would have been able to maintain more handpumps, say up to 100.  However such an increase in work would 
almost inevitably lead to there being weeks where jobs were delayed or queued, which would cause downtimes 
to rise.  
 
 
  
An effective system would need redundancy in order that in the event that the mechanics had other 
commitments or were ill (as occurred twice during the trial) the maintenance system does not cease to function. 
Based on this trial, we would suggest that in an area of similar geography to Kyuso a sustainable system could 
be run using two mechanics looking after up to a maximum of two hundred pumps between them.  With higher 
pump density and better roads, then this could increase, with two repairs possible per mechanic per day; in 
more dispersed and remote settings than Kyuso this number would certainly fall. To avoid perverse incentives 
mechanic wages would be structured by long-term performance, not per repair. 
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The data generated by the WDTs can be used to 
illustrate patterns of pump use over different scales, 
for example: 
 
1. Different levels of use throughout the day, 
comparing wet and dry periods (right); 
 
2. Spatial distribution of water use over the 
district (below); 
 
3. Variation in weekly use across the year 
between all pump (overleaf). 
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4.1.3. Operational Costs 
All recurring maintenance costs were systematically recorded. A detailed inventory was kept of spare parts used 
and costs; each visit was monitored by time, distance and spare parts used; and information costs. The 
annualised, recurring cost per repair in the trial was USD 62. With 136 repair visits this sums to USD 8,368 in 
2013, with a crude average of USD 127 per handpump. 
 
Spare parts represented 28 per cent of total costs. When the mechanic was called out he was instructed to do a 
basic service of low-cost but frequently failing parts. This led to (rubber) U-seals being replaced in most cases 
(85%) followed by rod centralisers (43%). Three quarters of total spare part costs were attributable to three larger 
parts: cylinders (21%), rising mains (23%) and rods (29%). 
 
Information costs represent 27 per cent of 
recurring costs, including one daily 
message and a replacement battery. 
Current power consumption requires 
battery changes every two years, which 
can be included in the maintenance 
programme. In the study period, data 
transmission was programmed to be sent 
four times a day embedding hourly 
batches of data. Hourly data offer a level 
of understanding important for a research 
programme but unnecessary for an 
operational programme where one daily 
message embedding six blocks of four hourly usage data would be sufficient. While it represents a significant 
cost, reliable and regular data are critical for the monitoring of maintenance services to ensure service delivery 
performance is achieved and improved. In addition, pricing, planning and regulation all depend on the data 
generated.  
 
Transport costs are similar to spare parts and data transmission (26%).  Here, transport costs included petrol, 
repairs and depreciation for an off-road motorbike. Labour costs accounted for a trained, local mechanic at USD 
11.6 (Ksh 1,000) per visit. 
 
With estimated water pumped per handpump and repair costs it is possible to measure the unit cost of water 
production. This controls for the number of repairs per pump by annual water usage. As illustrated below, 
handpumps with high costs of production are linked to low volumes of water pumped. Lower unit costs of 
water production are associated with more heavily used handpumps. The year of installation appears a weak 
guide to production costs suggesting older pumps can be economical if demand is high. The data provide 
guidance on handpumps that may be uneconomical to repair over time, particular if they are lightly used and 
co-located near alternative and more efficient handpumps. Maintenance service providers and water service 
regulators can usefully apply this information in improving operational performance and benchmarking sector 
guidelines. Further, consistently high production costs can be traced back to installation records to determine if 
environmental or particular drilling companies may have contributed to above average repair costs. 
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4.2.  Financial Sustainability 
 
Financial sustainability is critical to maintaining rural water services. The financial challenge reflects individual 
and group constraints, hence attention must be directed to: (a) designing a fair payment system; (b) reducing 
weak incentives for poor people to pre-pay, and (c) ensuring payments are sufficient to cover both minor and 
major repairs. 
 
This section shows how the Kyuso model operates financially with arrangements for aligning payments with 
service delivery, designing a fair and flexible pricing scheme, and pooling financial risk across clustered 
communities. Answers to the following questions will be provided based on evidence from Kyuso: 
 
• Can individual users be incentivised to pre-pay for handpump maintenance? 
• Are current and future payments sufficient to cover operational costs? 
• Can the risk be pooled to reduce the burden of high individual repair costs? 
• How can pricing be fair across heterogeneous user groups? 
 
4.2.1. User Payment Is Contingent on Service Delivery 
 
The lack of incentives for users to regularly pre-pay 
handpump fees has been identified as one of the 
challenges facing rural water supply schemes. If 
communities fail to save money in advance this 
commonly leads to long downtimes, increasing 
dissatisfaction with their water supply system and 
sometimes abandonment of the handpump.  It can also 
lead to higher overall costs as a mechanic may need to 
make one visit to diagnose and quote for a repair, and 
then a second to actually undertake the repair once 
funds have been collected and spare part procured. 
 
The Kyuso model builds on the premise that the 
demonstration of an effective maintenance service will generate demand for higher service levels, expressed by a 
greater willingness to pay for this service by handpump users. The strongest incentives for the users are the 
speed and quality of service delivered by a trained and reliable mechanic. 
 
The focus group discussions revealed that water 
users especially value the time-saving dimension of 
the maintenance service, which allows them to 
avoid collecting water from more distant, dirty or 
expensive sources, and pursue income-generating 
activities instead.  
 
Water users from 630 households at all 66 
handpumps were asked about their previous 
payment levels for handpump maintenance and 
their willingness to pay on a monthly basis for the 
new level of service. At the 46 handpumps that 
broke and were repaired in 2013 there was a three-
fold increase in the number of communities willing 
to pre-pay regularly for handpump maintenance 
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from 29 per cent to 91 per cent. They also expressed a willingness to pay in the future five times more than 
previous payment level. Before the trial, the mean monthly household contribution was USD 0.2; following the 
new maintenance service the willingness to pay has increased to USD 1 per household per month (see below). 
This corresponds with an average payment of USD 23 per month per handpump. 
 
Service delivery increases willing-to-pay levels 
 
 
  
Even the users at handpumps which were not yet serviced (n=20) experienced an increase in terms of 
willingness to contribute and of revenue levels, as awareness about the service has spread. Overall, those who 
have experienced the new maintenance service are willing to pay over 50 per cent more (USD 1) than those who 
have not experienced it (USD 0.6), which underlines the value that Kyuso‘s handpump users see in the new 
maintenance service.  
 
4.2.2. Spatial Distribution 
Handpump density has important implications for operational management and investment planning.  The 
study found three different ways that handpumps were geographically grouped.  These groupings showed 
different usage patterns, which would inform policy and operational planning. Population density does not vary 
greatly across all three groups. 
 
In Kyuso we adopted the following geographical 
density classification: 
 
• Single - isolated pumps with no 
improved alternative water sources 
nearby;  
 
• Pair - with one neighbour – pumps 
often shared between user groups; 
and, 
 
• Cluster - three or more handpumps in 
close proximity, often found along 
riverbeds. 
 
 
 
 
  Water Programme, Working Paper 1 – March 2014 21 
The classification reflects different pump use behaviours contingent on location. In Kyuso, we found 17 singles, 
eight pairs and four clusters (eight pumps on average per cluster). While single pumps do not have the highest 
pump volume per hour, the users’ willingness to pay for the new maintenance service is highest (USD 280 per 
year). As is well-rehearsed in the literature user demand is often shaped by the availability of alterative water 
sources. Pairs pump the highest volume of water and also face the highest average repair costs, at USD 141 per 
year; their willingness to pay is USD 203 per year. Clusters had the lowest willingness to pay with payment 
matching repair costs at USD 103. Since many alternatives are available, the need for a high payment to keep a 
specific pump operational may not be perceived as strong.  
 
It is notable that only one out of the two in any pair was non-functional at any given time – and in cases of 
breakdown users were usually allowed to use the other pump. Clusters also had at least 50 per cent of their 
pumps working at any given time, suggesting excessive redundancy. This may represent an inefficient 
investment in infrastructure, as well as reducing the financial sustainability of the maintenance service.  As the 
figure below illustrates, and in contrast to the earlier mapping figure, volumetric use by spatial distribution is 
critical to quantify both performance of past investments and to provide an objective basis for future 
investments. Investment decisions without such data are opaque at best and open to manipulation by vested 
interests that may weakly reflect water needs.  
 
Handpump volumetric use by average litres per hour, 2013 
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4.2.3. Scale Reduces Risk 
It is difficult for communities to meet unpredictable and volatile repair costs over time. However, if handpumps 
are pooled, financial risk can be smoothed and water service reliability increased. 
4.2.3.1. Repair Cost  
Of our sample of 66 handpumps 70 per cent required at least one repair in 2013. The number of repairs ranged 
from one to eleven; 63 per cent of broken handpumps required more than one repair. Repair costs per 
handpump ranged from USD 54 to USD 649. The latter was for one handpump requiring eleven repairs. The 
average cost of each repair was USD 62. 
 
Even averaging repair costs over a month smooth costs out considerably. The maximum cost was highest in 
April to June 2013, which may indicate that some communities get major repairs done in the wet season to avoid 
larger problems in the dry season when water is most needed.  The variation in cost underlines the importance 
of regular payments to smooth repair cost peaks over the whole year. Discussions with the communities 
confirmed this finding – the user groups at all 66 pumps agreed that payments should be made regularly 
throughout the year and at the same rate.  
 
 
 
4.2.3.2.   Previous Payment  
The average level of pre-payment across all pumps, prior to the start of the free maintenance service, was USD 
80 per year. However, 22 per cent of all handpumps pre-pay with their average payment of USD 353 per year. 
For the other 78 per cent of handpumps, nothing is saved. So when a handpump fails the first step is to try and 
get some money together which can take two weeks or longer. It is only when this money has been raised that a 
mechanic would order spare parts, which may not be immediately available.  
4.2.3.3. Future Payment 
At the end of 2013 as the free maintenance service ended we re-interviewed all communities to learn of their 
experience of the service. In particular, we wanted to know if they would agree to pre-pay to keep the service 
running and how much they would pre-pay. This process often took several meetings as communities met to 
discuss in very active and lively debates. Overall, 89 per cent of communities said they wanted to keep the 
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maintenance programme running with an average payment of USD 21 per month per handpump, or USD 250 
per year. This results in 2.5-fold increase in overall pre-payment finance per year – assuming that all households 
will pay every month of the year. This increase in willingness-to-pay demonstrates the high value Kyuso’s water 
users assign to the new maintenance service. Given some large and unproven assumptions on maintaining 
future payments this underlines the critical role of community finance, but also the almost certain need for 
external financial support. 
4.2.3.4. Pooling Cost  
Scale can smooth uneven repair costs that individual communities can bear in a good year but not in a bad year. 
No one can predict when a bad year will fall. Repairs can be related to environmental conditions (e.g. 
groundwater levels), poor installation (e.g. incorrect screens, poor alignment) or wear and tear. An unlucky 
community may have a badly installed handpump in an area of variable groundwater with a local mechanic 
who is not competent. Pump MUA-055 experienced such a bad year with the highest number of repairs and 
highest costs. This could not have been met through current payments; this pump may have been abandoned if 
the community had been obliged to pay all the repair costs. Scale pools financial risk while smoothing costs. If 
the stated willingness to pay of all pump user group reflected the actual future payment collected, this would 
raise sufficient revenue to have covered all repair costs in 2013; however, if communities chose not to pool 
revenue, 43 per cent of communities would not have met their individual costs. Working alone makes no 
financial sense. Once the principle of pooling costs and payments is established, a flexible and fair pricing 
scheme can be developed. 
 
Repair costs, previous and future payments for the maintenance service 
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4.2.4. Fair and Flexible Pricing 
Fair and flexible pricing is possible through observed data on handpump usage.  Such a system would balance 
economic efficiency with fairness better than a “flat rate per pump” method of charging.  The data captured by 
the transmitters shows how this can be possible.  Linking the cost of maintenance services with observed usage 
levels allows the price to be matched to the demand for water.  It is more equitable and more likely to be 
sustained in the longer term than a flat rate system, under which lightly used pumps with few users would, on a 
per capita basis, effectively be subsidising more heavily used pumps.  
 
A fair and flexible pricing structure could divide pumps into groups based on average usage levels. Each group 
would pay a corresponding monthly maintenance service fee which is flexible to changes in usage patterns over 
time (more/less/same).  The figure below shows that even a simple system of usage/pricing bands can be 
shown to create a system that is both simple and equitable, keeping the equivalent rate per unit volume at a 
sustainable level for all user groups.  In contrast the equivalent water rate under a flat-rate-per-pump system 
that generated the same total revenue is shown; this would have some pump users paying an extremely high 
rate. 
 
 
  
Under the flexible system the average rate user groups pay is the equivalent of USD 0.46 per m³ and the highest 
rate any user group pays is the equivalent of USD 1.00 per m³.  This pricing structure was set so that the revenue 
that would be generated would cover the local costs of the Kyuso trial (i.e. labour, transport, spare parts and 
information costs). In comparison, current ‘pay-as-you-go’ rates are 2 Ksh per 20 litre jerrycan (USD 1.16 per m³). 
This comparison indicates that an information-driven charging scheme can be financially viable and 
economically efficient (in that it covers the variable costs), while keeping payment rates at a level that is both 
realistic and equitable in terms of users’ ability and willingness to pay for it.    
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5. Institutional Transformations for Rural Water 
Services 
 
The study provides unique insights of observed, hourly data of the usage patterns of 66 handpumps in a remote 
and poor area of rural Kenya. Results provide new evidence to address institutional, operational and financial 
challenges of reliable rural water services. Sustainable progress is conditional on regular and reliable 
information. Information is not costless but amplifies value for water users, government and donors. A least-cost 
logic that only invests in infrastructure and leaves communities to manage handpumps on their own is neither 
the preferred social choice nor one that delivers lasting benefits. This entrenched but false economy undermines 
a sustainable business case for rural water investments and is challenged by the evidence from this study. 
 
Transmitters from smart handpumps generate granular and inclusive data that chart new and accountable 
pathways to reduce institutional costs and deliver more effective and sustainable services at scale. The 
transformational opportunity lies in information enabling new maintenance services that smooth financial risk 
from unpredictable repair costs and promote a new model that is performance-based. The new model promotes 
an output-based payment model sharing costs between users, government and donors based on quantifiable 
results.  
 
The new model is based on the following design principles: 
 
1. Institutional and Regulatory Reform 
a. Rural water services regulation to introduce process benchmarks, and then performance 
benchmarks on water service indicators, that map on to the Human Right to Water. 
b. Accountability promoted by public dissemination of performance metrics through internet 
and/or social media.  
c. A socially-acceptable, handpump maintenance service model that serves, but is not directly 
managed by, the community. 
 
2. Operational Sustainability 
a. Scale to insure against unpredictable risks of high repair costs, both for the users and 
maintenance service provider. 
b. Operational performance measured and evaluated with objective indicators (i.e. downtime). 
c. Water production costs can be accurately monitored to determine more efficient maintenance 
and asset replacement strategies. 
 
3. Financial Sustainability 
a. Pooling handpump payments to insure against financial risk.  
b. Fair and flexible water payments align handpump use with maintenance costs. 
c. Payments should follow a trial period to increase participation and revenue.  
d. Pre-payment to smooth repair costs for communities over the year. 
e. The cost of institutional design and uncertainty of actual future payment require government 
and/or funder support in establishing the new maintenance model. Operational cost variability 
may make user payments alone insufficient to cover all costs, thus requiring targeted, external 
support. 
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An Output-based Payment Model of Rural Water Services 
 
 
  
An output-based payment model outlines a new framework for donor and government behaviour in Africa. 
Investing in information that objectively reveals performance will challenge policy orthodoxy to generate debate 
and reflection. The model explicitly promotes universal coverage which enforces discipline and coordination of 
multiple actors at scale. Few African countries have the capacity to manage a fluctuating portfolio of national 
and international NGOs that often work independently of government and for limited periods of time. 
Government and NGOs that are committed to universal and reliable water services should support a 
consolidated and accountable national programme.  
 
A national rural water regulation system that documents existing and new investments by environmental, 
technical and operational indicators will provide an invaluable resource to monitor and regulate investment 
behaviour and outcomes at scale. Such a system may be built from below at sub-national levels such as in Kyuso 
District or a larger political scale to continuously inform national government goals and priorities. For example, 
Kwale County is introducing the model described above to link with the Water Services Regulatory Board at the 
national level in Kenya. Lessons from Kyuso are being incorporated in this new programme of work to address 
the limitations identified. 
 
By 2050 Africa will increase its rural population by 50 per cent to over 0.9 billion people. In the last two decades 
of rural water investments in Africa major progress has been made but 35 million more people lack improved 
water access in 2011 than 1990, based on the narrow definition of households’ self-reported main drinking water 
source. This figure will likely under-estimate the Human Right to Water’s more expansive and universal goal of 
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reliable services of sufficient, safe and affordable services each and every day. With a one per cent increase of 
rural piped water services between 1990 and 2011 (4% to 5%), handpumps will inevitably play a significant role 
in providing water in the time required for Africa to shift to a wealthier and more urban population. The 
handpump solution will continue to play a critical bridge in improving the health and welfare of the one in three 
rural Africans currently without safe water. The Kyuso study exploits an expanding mobile architecture and 
global policy framework to offer a new model to respond to one of Africa’s enduring and more elusive 
challenges. 
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6. Appendices 
6.1. Data and Methodology 
6.1.1. Experimental Design 
A Randomised Control Trial with two treatment types (Active-Management and Crowd-Sourced) and a control 
offers statistical validity by reducing potential biases and confounding factors.  However, this  design was not 
feasible for methodological, ethical and statistical reasons: 
 
1. Random assignment of fee-paying, control handpumps would have likely co-located some controls with 
free service, treatment handpumps in a pair or cluster. This would have biased the results as control 
handpumps would have been abandoned in favour of treatments after the first control failure. 
2. Local government (District Water Office) did not support treating rural water users differently on 
ethical grounds. It was agreed a larger study that could geographically isolate a quasi-control sample 
would be preferable and this has been implemented in the larger Kwale study launched in January 2014. 
3. The sample size in the study area gave sufficient power, with two treatments of equal size, to show the 
level of effect that we predicted.  However, if this had been two treatments and a control of equal sizes, 
the sample size would not have given sufficient power for statistical inference.   
 
Instead, the design had two treatments and included all the handpumps in the District.  The split between the 
two treatments was not random, but was determined by mobile signal strength sufficient to reliably transmit 
SMS messages.  This may have created a bias in terms of the ability of communities in the Crowd-Sourced 
treatment to call in breakdowns.  However, in all cases there was mobile signal near the handpump.  Usually 
there was signal in the settlement which the pumps served, but commonly none at the handpumps which were 
usually located in a depression.  In some cases there was sufficient signal strength to make a phone call standing 
by the handpump, but at the level of the transmitter built into the handle the signal dropped. 
 
Distance between treatments and the District Water Office was not controlled for but was similar (c.22 km).  
Observed water usage levels were not known before the trial though average usage level of the two treatments 
was found to be broadly similar (66 vs. 75 litres per hour). 
6.1.2. Exclusions 
Handpumps that were non-functional for environmental reasons (e.g. a dry well that required further 
excavation) were not included in the analysis of maintenance response times.  There were four repairs after which 
the same pump needed to be immediately repaired again.  In these cases the repairs were collapsed to a single 
repair, with the overall time to repair used in the calculations. For this reason sample numbers vary depending 
on the calculation being made. In all cases the calculations are conservative and underestimate downtimes. 
6.2. Waterpoint Data Transmitters 
6.2.1. Volumetric Estimation and Calibration 
The transmitters have an algorithm that translates pump usage, measured by the movement of the handle, into 
an estimate for the litres pumped.  Extensive tests in Zambia during the initial proof-of-concept phase 
(Thomson, et al. 2012) and further tests in Kenya generated a calibration that gave a volumetric output that was 
+/- 10% of the observed output.  However, there are many factors that will vary this accuracy across pumps and 
for this study pumps were not calibrated individually: the same calibration formula was used for all pumps.  As 
such, we refer to litres pumped primarily as a proxy for pump usage, not as a direct statement of the volume of 
water used in the way that should be considered equivalent to a water meter.    
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6.2.2. Missing Pump Data 
The trial involved the installation of transmitters into 66 Afridev pumps.  However, only 61 data streams have 
been used for analysis.  As such the data from five pumps have not been included in the analysis: 
 
 Two of the actively managed pumps, while registering good mobile signal at the time of installation, 
successfully transmitted insufficient data for meaningful analysis. Variable and unpredictable network 
performance affected all handpumps causing some data gaps but to a degree that was manageable. 
 Two of the silent monitoring pumps did not have their data retrieved as this process took place during 
the rains and two pump were on the other side of rivers that were not safely passable at the time. 
 One transmitter was vandalized (1.5%) with the antenna cable cut. 
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